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As the economics profession is split over the expected impact of the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act of 2009, we analyze the effects as if it were an experiment. Specifically, 
we analyze the effects of spending on employment using an instrumental variable difference-in-
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 The “Great Recession” of 2007-present has brought the efficacy of fiscal policy to 
smooth recessions into the center of public debate and has highlighted the state of 
macroeconomic theory. In particular, it has brought to the forefront, again, how 
macroeconomists cannot agree on how to predict the effects of large changes in fiscal policy. 
The main reason we cannot agree is that macroeconomic models capable of predicting the 
counterfactual results are extremely sensitive to their underlying assumptions. Furthermore, we 
have carefully observed very few, if any, large deviations in fiscal spending that would be 
necessary to test the different models’ predictions. Even the well-known New Deal programs 
enacted during the Great Depression such as the Works Progress Administration (WPA) and the 
Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) resulted in very small fiscal expenditures as measured as 
percent of GDP. As a result, American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which 
authorized $787 billion in fiscal stimulus money, is one of the largest macroeconomic 
experiments ever run. 
 It is worth highlighting the current division in macroeconomic theory. Prior to the current 
recession, it is probably fair to say that the majority of economists would have seen little need 
for active fiscal policy (outside of automatic stabilizers such as income taxes and unemployment 
insurance) for the management of the business cycle. Since at least the 1980s, prudent monetary 
policy had seemed sufficient to reduce both the frequency and severity of recessions in the 
United States and had arguably brought about the “Great Moderation,” a significant reduction in 
volatility of the business cycle. 
 However, faced with record job losses, collapsing housing prices, a deeply struggling 
financial system, and a Federal Reserve system entering uncharted territory with nominal interest 
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rates effectively set equal to zero percent, by early 2009, a strong bi-partisan coalition of 
economists began supporting the passage of a major fiscal stimulus package. Proponents of an 
active fiscal stimulus included Mark Zandi, and economic advisor to the McCain campaign, 
Nobel Laureates Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz, Martin Feldstein, head the National Bureau 
of Economic Research’s recession dating committee and an advisor to Ronald Reagan, and J. 
Bradford DeLong - Berkley economist and Deputy Assistant Treasury Secretary during the 
Clinton Administration. Indeed, the phrase “we’re all Keynesians now” became a common 
refrain. 
 In response to this vocal chorus of calls for a stimulus package, the CATO institute 
published a statement against such a policy reading:  
  Notwithstanding reports that all economists are now Keynesians and that 
we all support a big increase in the burden of government, we do not believe that 
more government spending is a way to improve economic performance. More 
government spending by Hoover and Roosevelt did not pull the United States 
economy out of the Great Depression in the 1930s. More government spending did 
not solve Japan's "lost decade" in the 1990s. As such, it is a triumph of hope over 
experience to believe that more government spending will help the U.S. today. To 
improve the economy, policy makers should focus on reforms that remove 
impediments to work, saving, investment and production. Lower tax rates and a 
reduction in the burden of government are the best ways of using fiscal policy to 
boost growth. (CATO Institute, 2009) 
 
The statement was signed by over 200 economists included Nobel Laureates Edward Prescott, 
Vernon Smith, and James Buchanan. They were joined by other notable critics including John 
Taylor, Stanford University and Undersecretary of the Treasury under George W. Bush, and 
Eugene Fama, an economist at the University of Chicago. Given the broad array of prominent 
economists on both side of this issue, a careful empirical examination of the stimulus package’s 
effects on labor markets and the economy over is certainly warranted. 
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 The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) (or the “stimulus package”) was 
passed and signed into law in February 2009 based on the hypothesis that the bill would increase 
GDP and employment. The estimates range by year, but for 2009 the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) predicted a rise in GDP of between 1.4% and 3.8%, a reduction in unemployment 
of between 0.5% and 1.3%, and an increase of between 0.8 million and 2.3 million jobs 
(Congressional Budget Office, 2009). These estimates for 2009 were based on a net increase of 
the government deficit of $184 billion and thus a cost of between $80.4 and $231.1 thousand for 
each job created. As of June 24, 2009, $138.2 billion has been made available and $40.5 billion 
has been spent. Therefore, we have begun to analyze the impact of the bill on employment. 
 Following the release of the 2nd quarter of 2009 GDP estimates in July, other economists 
have also begun to issue early estimates of the effects of stimulus package on the economy. A 
cursory examination of the 2nd quarter numbers clearly shows that government spending 
provided a lift to the economy and both Moody’s and IHS Global Insight estimated that the 
stimulus “has already saved more than 500,000 jobs.” (Leonhardt, 2009)  In remarks to the 
Economic Club of Washington D.C. on August 6, 2009, Christina D. Romer, Chair of President 
Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers, suggested that the economic stimulus package had 
saved 485,000 jobs nationwide and that at the state level there is a strong correlation between 
each individual state’s employment change over the previous 5 months and ARRA authorized 
Medicaid Spending by state. (Romer, 2009) 
 Given the large effects of the stimulus package estimated by economic modeling and 
simulation, we hypothesize that the effects of the stimulus package should be evident in state 
level employment data. Taking advantage of state by state variation in stimulus spending, we use 
a difference-in-difference approach to carry out our analysis. Although the estimation method 
has its skeptics, the approach frees of us of specifying a macroeconomic model (the cause of 
disagreement within the profession). Furthermore, it is easily replicated and interpreted. To date, 
the results show no correlation between the amount of spending and a change in employment 




 The observations are taken at the state level. In order to determine whether recent federal 
outlays impacted the number of jobs, we estimate the correlation between outlays and change in 
employment using the following equation:  
sss outlayemployment εαα ++=Δ 10                                       (1)   
where s = state. Both variables are scaled by the size of the labor force size in the state. 
Seasonally-adjusted employment data from both the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the 
Current Employment Statistics (CES) survey are available monthly from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. We use the six-month change in employment (January 2009 to June 2009) since 
outlays began in early 2009. Outlay data are available from the Recovery Accountability and 
Transparency Board (via http://www.recovery.gov/). Our outlay data are cumulative up to June 
24th, 2009.  We use data on outlays that have been “paid out”, rather than those either 
“announced” or “made available”, since it is the most likely to impact employment. Table 1 
presents summary statistics of the employment and outlay data. Between January and June 2009, 
the average job loss is roughly 50,000 per state in both surveys, and the average outlay is 
roughly $810 million per state. At the CBO’s estimates of $80-$231 thousand in stimulus per job 
created, the money paid out so far should have resulted in measurable employment gains. There 
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is also a significant amount of variation in employment changes and outlay amount across the 
states. 
Endogeneity is a concern in equation (1) since the direction of causality between 
employment changes and outlays is not clear. We aim to estimate the impact of outlays on 
employment changes, but it is possible that politicians disproportionately allocated outlays to 
high unemployment states. Given the specification of the data in equation (1), our estimate of  
1α  is biased if outlay allocations are correlated with the unexplained change in employment. 
There are two reasons to believe these variables are likely to be uncorrelated. First, it is more 
likely that outlay allocation decisions were based on the level of employment rather than the 
expected changes in employment. Second, outlay allocation decisions were made before changes 
in employment level are known. Putting these facts together, endogeneity of equation (1) 
requires that politicians made outlay allocation decisions in late 2008 and early 2009 based on 
their projections of the change in employment in the first half of 2009. Again, while Romer 
(2009) is certainly correct in her charge that “states whose economies are weaker tend to get 
more of these funds,” since the estimation is performed on changes in employment not the level 
of unemployment, in order for endogeneity to be an issue it must be the case that states whose 
economies were projected to weaken the most over the next 6 months tended to get more of these 
funds.  
 Although endogeneity seems remote, we nevertheless incorporate a two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) analysis in addition to the basic ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates. We use 
the total tenure of the state’s senators as an instrument following Boyle and Matheson (2009). 
The first stage is presented in Table 2 and provides justification for the choice of instrument. 
 Tables 3 and 4 present the estimation results for the CPS and the CES data, respectively. 
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The first and third columns of the tables provide estimates for equation (1) using OLS and 2SLS, 
respectively. The second and fourth columns include a second independent variable: the six-
month change of employment between July and December 2008, which is the six-month period 
prior to our dependent variable. This specification accounts for the trend of employment changes 
in each state. The final column of Table 2 also confirms that, indeed, states whose economies 
lost the most jobs in the 6 months prior to the passage of ARRA tended to receive more funding. 
The results show that outlays per capita have no statistically significant effect on 
employment. Indeed, the coefficients on spending are not even of the expected sign in 7 of the 8 
specifications. Further, the low r-squared values in all estimations suggest little connection 
between outlays and employment. Based on these results, we conclude that outlays thus far have 
had no discernable impact on job creation.  
 It should be noted that expansionary macroeconomic policies are always subject to lags. 
In this case, however, the use of “paid out” stimulus funds eliminates at least two of the common 
lags, the information lag and the implementation lag, as well part of the effect lag, since this is 
money that has actually been spent. Of course, any multiplier effects cannot be assumed to have 
fully incorporated into labor market. However, even absent any lagging multiplier effects, the 
stimulus should have already provided a measurable effect on employment according to the 
estimates of the CBO and others.  
 So what is one to make of the early results of this great macroeconomic experiment? As 
noted by Brad DeLong (2009), “On the theoretical side, it is very hard to build a model in which 
fiscal expansion has no effect on nominal income.” On the other hand, it is much easier to 
develop simple models in which changes in GDP do not translate into corresponding changes in 
employment. Indeed, employment during this recession, particular during the 4th quarter of 2008 
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and the first two quarters of 2009, appears to have dropped far more quickly than would have 
been predicted based on previous estimates of Okun’s Law based on historical data. It is entirely 
plausible that ARRA has stimulated the GDP without stimulating the labor market. The state 
level empirical evidence thus far, however, does not support the hypothesis that the stimulus 
package has had significant positive effects on state labor markets contrary to the estimations of 
many theoretical models.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Mean Minimum Maximum Variable 
(Std. Dev.) (State) (State) 
six-month change in employment -48,867 -319,533 12,617 
(Consumer Survey) -60,301 (CA) (TX) 
six-month change in employment -52,880 -365,800 6,200 
(Payroll Survey) -64,584 (CA) (ND) 
$4,491,535  $606,208  $25,600,000  outlays announced (in $1,000s) 
($4,734,697) (VT) (CA) 
$2,765,238  $348,448  $16,900,000  outlays made available (in $1,000s) 
($3,073,599) (DE) (CA) 
$810,385  $34,140  $8,221,146  outlays paid out (in $1,000s) 
($1,249,640) (WY) (CA) 
24.52 0 74 Sum of Senator Tenure 
(17.46) (CO) (WV) 
scaled by state’s labor force       
six-month change in employment/labor force -0.017 -0.048 0.0011 
(Consumer Survey) -0.0096 (WV) (VT) 
six-month change in employment/labor force -0.016 -0.041 0.017 
(Payroll Survey) -0.0084 (WY) (ND) 
$1.75  $1.17  $6.99  outlays announced (in $1,000s)/labor force 
-0.88 (NJ) (DC) 
$1.05  $0.64  $5.81  outlays made available (in $1,000s)/labor force
-0.71 (NV) (DC) 
$0.25  $0.10  $0.71  outlays paid out (in $1,000s)/labor force 
-0.1 (NE) (DC) 
Note: Both of Colorado's senators began January, 2009.
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Table 2: First Stage in Instrumental Variable Approach 
 
Estimate Estimate Variable 
(Std. Error) (Std. Error) 
0.00122* 0.00111*Sum of senator tenure 
(0.00065) (0.00059) 
  -5.35084**six-month change in employment 
between July and December 2008/labor 
force 
  (1.56198) 
0.21020** 0.19092**Constant 
(0.01955) (0.01855) 
r-squared 0.06790 0.25410 
 
Dependent Variable: outlays paid out (in $1000s)/labor force. (** and * denote significance at the 




Table 3: Results Using Current Population Survey Employment Data 
 
 OLS Estimates 2SLS Estimates 









-0.0044 0.0065 -0.1231 -0.1299 outlays paid out (in $1000s)/labor 
force (0.0132) (0.015) (0.0954) (0.1056) 
0.37 -0.4194 six-month change in employment 






-0.016** -0.017** 0.0126 0.0125 Constant 
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0230) (0.0231) 
r-squared 0.0023 0.0545   
 
Dependent Variable: six-month change in employment between January and June 2009/labor 







Table 4: Results Using Current Employment Statistics Payroll Survey Data 
 
 OLS Estimates 2SLS Estimates 









-0.011 -0.0086 -0.0092 -0.0084 outlays paid out (in $1000s)/labor 
force (0.011) (0.012) (0.0561) (0.0586) 
0.069 0.0667 six-month change in employment 






-0.014** -0.013** -0.0140 -0.0134 Constant 
(0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0135) (0.0117) 
r-squared 0.0177 0.0227   
 
Dependent Variable: six-month change in employment between January and June 2009/labor 
force (** and * denote significance at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively.) 
